In today’s Manipur and Nagaland, the question is no longer whether ceasefires should exist, but whether they can continue indefinitely without credible pathways to resolution.
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The ceasefire architecture of Northeast India was never designed for the fractured reality that Manipur has faced since May 2023. What were once parallel but manageable arrangements, the July 1997 ceasefire with the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (Isak-Muivah) (NSCN-IM) and the Suspension of Operations (SoO) agreements with Kuki-Zo armed groups in August 2008, are now operating in a dramatically altered geopolitical and ethnic landscape.
Since the outbreak of ethnic violence in 2023, which has displaced over 60,000 people and deeply segregated communities across the valley and hill districts, ceasefire arrangements are no longer seen as neutral instruments of peace. They are increasingly viewed through the lens of survival, territory, and perceived state alignment. Nowhere is this tension more visible than in the hill districts. Recent developments in Ukhrul district, particularly in Litan and adjoining areas such as Sinakeithei, highlight the fragility of the situation.
Against this backdrop, the structural differences between the two ceasefire systems are no longer merely administrative; they have become politically significant.
The NSCN (IM) ceasefire remains primarily a political arrangement. Its designated camps in Nagaland and “Taken Note Of” camps in Manipur function with significant autonomy. Security forces do not enter these camps, and cadres retain their weapons within them. Monitoring is non-intrusive, reflecting the long-standing political dialogue process.
The SoO agreements, in contrast, are security-centric. Camps are supervised, weapons are kept under a double-lock system, cadres receive stipends from the government, and movement is permission-based. The two most contentious aspects are the regulation of movement and the provision of financial support.
According to government and assembly disclosures, the number of SoO cadres under the two umbrella groups—the Kuki National Organisation (KNO) and the United People’s Front (UPF)—is estimated at around 2,000 to 2,200 individuals. These cadres are housed in multiple designated camps across districts such as Kangpokpi, Churachandpur, Tengnoupal, and parts of Chandel and Pherzawl.
A key concern relates to the conditions under which weapons are withdrawn from the double-lock system. The persistence of armed exchanges in tense areas such as parts of Ukhrul district raises questions about how strictly these controls are being enforced. It creates the impression, whether accurate or not, that permissions for withdrawal may be granted during periods of heightened tension and not during peaceful periods. In narrow and sensitive operational territories, this further raises concerns that such incidents may be occurring in close proximity to security forces tasked with supervisory functions of SoO cadres.
Perceptions of this nature have wider consequences. During earlier phases of the Meitei–Kuki clashes, allegations surfaced that SoO cadres were receiving tacit support from security forces. Regardless of their veracity, such beliefs gain traction when ground realities appear inconsistent with stated protocols. If the double-lock system is seen as liberal during periods of conflict, it risks undermining the very purpose of regulation to prevent outbreaks of violence. A mechanism intended to contain violence may instead be perceived as enabling escalation and become counterproductive.
Kangpokpi district, in particular, has emerged as a major concentration zone due to its strategic location between the valley and Naga-dominated hill districts. This narrow stretch of land along the eastern and western edges of the Imphal Valley continues to be a flash point between the Meiteis and Kukis and has now emerged as a source of tension between Naga and Kuki communities, particularly involving the Tangkhuls. Reports of recurring firing, including the alleged use of automatic weapons and rocket bombs, have intensified concerns about the adequacy of monitoring and enforcement.
The concentration of SoO camps in this narrow geographic band is increasingly problematic. The corridor-like geography of Kangpokpi, linking multiple districts, means that even regulated movement of cadres can have spillover effects across administrative boundaries, reinforcing local anxieties. This dynamic appears to be playing out in Ukhrul district, where areas such as Sinakeithei have witnessed repeated tensions. Allegations that SoO-linked militants are attempting to assert control over such villages, potentially to consolidate territorial presence, have further heightened concerns.
The financial dimension adds another layer of complexity. Each SoO cadre is entitled to a monthly stipend of around INR 6,000, along with rations and logistical support. This means that the stipend paid out to each SoO member in the last 17 years would be around Rs.12 lakhs so far. The Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) audit found that INR 27.38 crore was disbursed between 2018 and 2021 without Aadhaar-based biometric verification. This raises concerns about unverifiable beneficiaries, including the possibility of duplication, inflated cadre strength, or weak financial oversight. The continuation of such payments over 17 years to a 2000-strong cadre strength is around INR 244 crores with potential significant leakages. The revised SoO framework, which mandates Aadhaar-based verification and the identification of foreign elements, may reveal the true extent of these loopholes, potentially further eroding public trust.
In contrast, there is no publicly structured stipend system for NSCN (IM) cadres under the 1997 ceasefire arrangement. The group is widely understood to sustain itself through parallel taxation mechanisms and informal economic networks rather than direct state-funded support. This creates a deeply uneven perception in the public mind.
One group operates autonomous camps, retains arms, and maintains parallel authority structures with minimal state intrusion, without direct financial support from the state. Another operates under tighter regulation, is effectively disarmed through the double-lock system, and receives direct financial assistance from the government.
In the pre-2023 context, such asymmetry could be managed. Today, it cannot. The ethnic conflict has territorialised identity. Every movement of armed cadres, every camp location, and every financial flow is now interpreted through the prism of demographic change, land control, and political advantage. This is why tensions are no longer confined to traditional flashpoints. The clashes in Ukhrul’s Litan area and Sinakeitei village are a warning signal; the fault lines are expanding. If these parallel ceasefire systems continue without recalibration, they risk becoming sources of instability and exasperation rather than instruments of peace and diplomacy.
Three steps now appear urgent. First, complete financial transparency in the SoO framework is essential. Aadhaar-linked direct transfers, third-party audits, and real-time verification must be strictly enforced, with accountability for any proven irregularities.
Second, the geographic distribution of camps must be rationalised with sensitivity to local demographics and inter-community boundaries, particularly in narrow and strategically sensitive corridors. The current model risks creating overlapping zones of tension and should be reconsidered.
Third, any intrusion by SoO cadres into neighbouring district jurisdictions should be treated as a violation of revised ground rules, warranting strict penalties, including possible termination of the agreement.
The Government of India must recognise that post-2023 Manipur is fundamentally different from the Manipur of earlier decades. Policies designed for insurgency management must adapt to an environment shaped by ethnic separation, mass displacement, and deep mistrust. The evolving geopolitical context makes it imperative to re-energise and reassess the Naga peace process if the current stalemate is to be broken.
Ceasefires have prevented large-scale war in northeast India. But in today’s Manipur and Nagaland, the question is no longer whether ceasefires should exist, but whether they can continue indefinitely without credible pathways to resolution. The asymmetry in financial support, particularly stipends in economically fragile regions, risks creating perverse incentives to prolong such arrangements. For unemployed youth with limited opportunities, these stipends may appear as a form of indefinite state-backed livelihood.
In a conflict shaped as much by perception as by reality, such dynamics matter. The belief that state funds may indirectly sustain armed formations, especially in a politically sensitive environment, can deepen mistrust. These perceptions, whether fully accurate or not, may ultimately shape the trajectory of peace in the region.
Ngaranmi Shimray
New Delhi