“... greater power and stronger capabilities lead to responsibility and restraint... respect for international law; territorial integrity and sovereignty” announced External Affairs minister S Jaishankar, in a vague reference to China’s aggressive posture in South China Sea, Taiwan, Australia and in India’s neighbourhood. However, the Ministry of External Affairs has stopped short of unequivocal condemnation against Russia’s invasion on Ukraine, which has become an independent nation following the collapse of the former Soviet Union. New Delhi’s equi-closeness with both Russia and the West is manifested in its abstention on the vote of the UN Security Council’s draft resolution ‘deploring in the strongest terms’ Russia’s aggression.
India’s diplomatic dilemma with strategic partners on both sides of the Ukraine-Russian conflict has its basis in New Delhi’s dependence on the West and Russia for its military hardware. The bulk of India’s defence supplies accounting to 60%-70% come from Russia. This has compelled New Delhi to forge ties with Moscow for continued defence supplies especially in times when Indo-China tension is on high alert. Moreover, New Delhi could not sever its closeness with the West either. India shares a budding market with the West. Host of American equipment are employed for reconnaissance and surveillance activities along the China-India border. In addition, it is reported that winter clothing for 50,000 troops is supplied from western strategic partners.
Amid all these unfolding circumstances is the disturbing development of symbiosis between Moscow and Beijing. The relationship between the two power capitals is precipitated by its common antagonism against the American hegemony. Though the two emerging powers have certain grey areas where they don’t see eye-to-eye, particularly the reckless move of China in South China Sea, the Ukraine crisis has brought them ever closer and in such times when the prospect of Russia-China axis is being explored for regional influence. Of late, Russia has seen swiftly gravitating towards China for assistance as Western sponsored sanctions hit Moscow. Defence analysts are concerned about the burgeoning relationship as China may influence Moscow to shelve its defence supplies to India, with which India defends its border in LAC and LOC.
New Delhi by treading a tightrope policy on the ongoing Ukraine-Russia crisis by neither condemning nor approving the invasion has only emboldened Beijing to experiment an aggressive adventure in India’s neighbourhood, and not forgoing India’s restive regions. India’s failure to outrightly condemn Russia’s Ukraine invasion, which is subject to interpreting it as endorsing Putin’s military action, is being closely watched by world leaders, particularly China which has its interest in India’s northern and eastern flank. The constant threat of China, who has long claimed Arunachal Pradesh as South Tibet and a part of China “since ancient times”, over Arunachal Pradesh is likely to gain momentum by New Delhi’s refusal to condemn Russia’s action. Considering the cordial relationship enjoyed by Islamabad and Beijing, there is no security guarantee that China would pressure Pakistan to trouble India’s western stretch. If such a wave of crisis in a wild dream dawns upon New Delhi, it is highly doubtful that the world community would come to India’s rescue.
New Delhi’s persistent withdrawal from condemning Russia’s action has raised two fundamental political conundrums. In the first situation, if China annexed Arunachal Pradesh (premised on their claim) and instigate anti-India elements in restive Nagaland and Manipur from there, or even went to the extent of declaring the two states sovereign and independent thereby meddling with India’s internal affairs like Russia did in eastern Ukraine, would New Delhi continue to stay silent just as it is? Or in the second situation, if Pakistan unilaterally declared independence of Jammu & Kashmir under China’s patronage and sent there its “peacekeeping force” to restore order, will New Delhi wait and watch the geopolitical dynamics while pleading for “territorial integrity” sans military means? The given two hypothetical situations had questioned New Delhi’s determined silence over Russia’s violation of “rules-based” international order.
It is high time New Delhi abdicates its double standard on international policy, reconsider its affiliation with Russia and assume a more proactive role in various international issues. Though it claims itself to be an ardent advocate of “rules-based” international order, such hype is restricted to Indo-Pacific only where India has huge strategic stakes and falls short to deliver to their words on the ongoing Ukraine crisis.
A more worrisome factor in New Delhi’s strategic calculation is the China-initiated Quad with Russia, Pakistan and Iran as its alliance partners. Turkey is rumoured to be its possible constituent member. China-led Quad appears to completely encircle India in its western and northern fronts. Facing embargo in view of the western imposed sanctions and becoming a ‘pariah’, Russia is tilted towards Beijing and its inclination is only set to get fastened with ensued geopolitical dynamics. In the words of Brigadier Rahul Bhonsle (retired), “the Beijing-Moscow Axis that has been proliferating in recent years,...(pose) a formidable threat to world peace as both strive to aggressively carve out a new regional and global order based arbitrarily on financial and military might”, is a stark reminder to re-orient New Delhi’s foreign policy.
As India is caught busy with an unabated Hindutva agenda and RSS-isation of educational institutions, Beijing has snatched away India’s pricey friendly nations in its neighbourhood. India is alienated in its own region. While the present dispensation has been trying to project a strong India in its domestic affairs by stifling individual fundamental rights, it has failed to present a strong India on the world stage. Whereas New Delhi must first project a united India to stave off unsolicited adventurism (like Ukrainians), yet its current Hindutva agenda would only stealthily further diminish India’s diversities thereby compromising its power play.
Russia, by nature, will prioritise its defence material for domestic use rather than concentrating on export of its equipment. It is projected that such would preclude India’s military operational efficiency due to shortages of spares to replace component deficiencies for in-service Russia-sourced weaponries. In such a scenario, India’s ability to contain a two-pronged attack from its western and northern flanks will be limited. New Delhi ought to diversify its purchase for defence equipment by looking beyond Moscow. It must equip itself to handle a two-pronged invasion while simultaneously looking east (in line with Act East) to posture itself as a world power. This includes a strong and decisive presence in various international issues and well as vociferous condemnation against violation of "rules-based" order without favouritism. Indecision will only circumscribe its quest for regional influence.
Nukhosa Chüzho
khozch@gmail.com
Kohima