NEW DELHI — Turkey's
vocal support for Pakistan following India's retaliatory strikes against terror
networks after the brutal killing of civilians in Pahalgam, reflects a deeper
strategic ambition under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. More than a reaction to
a regional conflict, it signals Turkey's growing aspiration to replace Saudi
Arabia as the leading voice in the Islamic world and to expand its influence
across South and Southeast Asia, challenging traditional alignments.
The rivalry came into sharper focus in 2019, when Malaysian
Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad hosted a summit to discuss challenges facing
the Muslim world. Saudi Arabia refused to attend and pressured others,
including Pakistan, to follow suit. Turkish President Erdogan, by contrast, fully
backed Mahathir. Riyadh viewed the summit as a threat to its religious
authority and dominance over the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).
Analysts suggested that Saudi leaders feared diplomatic
isolation, especially as regional competitors like Turkey, Iran, and Qatar took
part. Pakistan's then Prime Minister Imran Khan initially planned to attend but
ultimately withdrew, reportedly under Saudi pressure.
Saudi Arabia has long claimed leadership of the Islamic
world, as guardian of Mecca and Medina and head of the OIC. Its global
promotion of Wahhabi Islam gave it unmatched soft power. That position,
however, has witnessed a change under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's
reforms. These include curbing religious police, expanding entertainment, and
allowing women to drive—moves signalling a shift from strict orthodoxy. His
Vision 2030 plan, focused on economic diversification and modernization, marks
a broader retreat from exporting religious ideology.
This evolving posture has opened space for other
Muslim-majority countries to step forward.
Turkey, under Erdogan, has moved to fill that vacuum.
Drawing on history, strategic alliances, and ideological ambition, Ankara is
positioning itself for a larger leadership role in the Islamic world.
Turkey's effort to forge a distinct Islamic identity is
rooted in Cold War politics and nationalist reinterpretations of Islam. During
that period, American-backed initiatives like Operation Gladio promoted a
Turkish form of Islamic Nationalism to counter rising leftist influence. A key
figure in this movement, Alparslan Turkes — founder of the Nationalist Movement
Party (MHP) and the Grey Wolves — famously declared, "Turkishness is our
body, Islam is our soul." He advocated for Turkish, rather than Arabic, in
religious texts and rituals, reinforcing a nationalized form of Islam distinct
from Pan-Islamism.
Although Turkes rejected international Islamic unity, his
views shaped a tradition in which Islam served to bolster Turkish nationalism.
This synthesis laid the ideological foundation for later efforts to revive
elements of the Ottoman past.
Under President Erdogan and the Justice and Development
Party (AKP), that legacy has evolved into what many call
"neo-Ottomanism". Erdogan avoids framing his agenda as pan-Islamic
but presents Turkey as the natural heir to Ottoman leadership in the Muslim
world. His emphasis on Muslim solidarity — particularly with marginalized
communities — blends humanitarian rhetoric with strategic ambition. This dual
posture is evident in Turkey's involvement in Syria, Libya, the Caucasus, and
more recently, South Asia.
Erdogan is one of the few world leaders to have addressed
Pakistan's parliament, a gesture underscoring the depth of bilateral ties. His
speech, invoking prayers for enduring solidarity, was more than symbolic.
Turkey and Pakistan share a long history of strategic and ideological
alignment.
Their partnership dates back to the early Cold War. In 1954,
they signed a Treaty of Friendship and joined Western-led alliances like CENTO
and SEATO. While India pursued non-alignment, Pakistan aligned with the US
bloc. As a NATO member, Turkey found common ground with Pakistan in their
opposition to communism and in their strategic locations. Cultural and
ideological affinities followed. Turkish Islamists continue to admire Pakistani
thinkers such as Abul A'la Maududi and Muhammad Iqbal. During the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan, Turkish and Pakistani intelligence quietly coordinated
support for the Mujahideen, backed by the US and Gulf states. What began as
Cold War cooperation has since evolved into lasting Islamic solidarity.
Turkey is currently the second-largest supplier of arms to
Pakistan. Its contributions include advanced drones, naval systems, and broader
modernization of Pakistan's armed forces. Turkish-made drones such as the
Bayraktar TB2 have reportedly been used by Pakistan in sensitive operations
along its border with India.
Beyond military cooperation, the two countries have
formalized their relationship through the High-Level Strategic Cooperation
Council, which oversees joint initiatives in defines, trade, culture, and
education. Trade agreements and investment partnerships are expanding, with a
shared goal of reaching $5 billion in bilateral trade. Both nations also
coordinate on international platforms, advocating for the Muslim world on
issues like Islamophobia and Kashmir. Turkey has consistently supported
Pakistan's position on Kashmir at the United Nations and in other diplomatic
settings.
The personal rapport between Erdogan and successive
Pakistani leaders adds symbolic weight to this partnership. Frequent visits,
public expressions of solidarity, and mutual praise continue to reinforce the
image of a close and enduring alliance.
The unofficial but potent link between Turkish and Pakistani
Islamist movements adds another layer to the relationship. Turkish Islamists
see themselves as part of a broader Islamic awakening, drawing intellectual
inspiration from Pakistan's religious thinkers. Even during Turkey's secular
era, conservative networks maintained quiet relationships with Pakistani
counterparts. These relationships were strengthened through shared
participation in causes such as the Afghan jihad.
Post-9/11, as the global political climate changed, Turkey
repositioned itself as a bridge between Islamic values and modern governance.
Erdogan capitalized on this image, presenting Turkey as a model Islamic
democracy, while also reactivating conservative Islamic networks domestically
and abroad.
This ideological proximity is not confined to rhetoric.
Turkish NGOs and education institutions have found fertile ground in Pakistan,
particularly through religious schools and social service initiatives. These
efforts create long-term cultural and ideological alignment.
The emerging Turkey–Pakistan axis is now extending to
Bangladesh, marking a broader realignment in South Asia. In January 2025, a
Turkish delegation visited Dhaka, shortly after Pakistan and Bangladesh agreed
to hold joint naval exercises — their first major military cooperation since
the 1971 war. For the first time since independence, Pakistani troops are
operating on Bangladeshi soil, raising concerns in New Delhi.
Further fuelling anxiety is the rising presence of
Turkish-backed NGOs in Bangladesh. One such group, Saltanat-e-Bangla,
reportedly tied to Ankara's religious soft power network, promotes a
revisionist vision of a "Greater Bangladesh" that includes parts of
India and Myanmar. While still fringe, such narratives can gain traction in
unstable political climates.
For India, already on edge over Chinese influence, Turkey's
expanding footprint presents a new strategic challenge.
Turkey's growing ties with Pakistan and Bangladesh go beyond
cultural or religious affinity. They reflect a calculated strategy to position
Ankara as a leading force in the Muslim world, challenging the traditional
dominance of Gulf powers like Saudi Arabia and the UAE. By drawing on historical
links, ideological alignment, and strategic cooperation, Turkey aims to
reassert itself as both a regional and religious power.
The realignment remains fluid, and its trajectory will hinge
on how other key players — India, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and China — respond. But
the trend is clear: Turkey is no longer on the margins of South Asia's Muslim
politics. It is now actively shaping the region's alliances and geopolitical
narrative.
(The writer is a New Delhi-based academic and specialist on
Southeast Asia and Islam. He has taught in the past in Japan, USA, Russia and
Malaysia. Views expressed are personal)
