Almost thirty years have passed since the Government of India and the NSCN (I-M) entered into a ceasefire agreement on August 1, 1997. What was originally intended as a temporary pause — a tranquil space for negotiating a political settlement — has gradually become the enduring structure itself.
Peace without a destination is not a settlement. After nearly thirty years, Nagaland is still waiting for the talks to say what they are for.
Almost thirty years have passed since the Government of India and the NSCN (I-M) entered into a ceasefire agreement on August 1, 1997. What was originally intended as a temporary pause — a tranquil space for negotiating a political settlement — has gradually become the enduring structure itself.
As of 1 August 2007, the ceasefire was extended indefinitely, though New Delhi took care to include a condition: it would remain “subject to progress in the talks.” By 2026, that phrase had become the most awkward line in the peace process. How long can a transitional arrangement endure before it ceases to be merely transitional?
A Framework Agreement was signed with the NSCN (I-M) on August 3, 2015. An Agreed Position was reached with the Working Committee of the Naga National Political Groups in November 2017. Neither produced a comprehensive settlement. Sections of Naga civil society now pose a more profound question: have the negotiations themselves become an integral part of the problem? Multiple taxation, intimidation, and ransom demands, they contend, have imposed costs that ordinary citizens were never asked to bear.
A ceasefire is not a license
The most detrimental public grievance is not abstract; rather, it is the proliferation of factions and the daily burdens they impose on shops, contractors, transporters, and salaried employees.
It is appropriate to scrutinize the assertion that underground organizations collect revenue solely because legitimate income sources are absent. However, it is unjust to accept this assertion as a justification. Factors such as organizational influence, factional competition, and customary practices can lead to extortion as readily as economic necessity. Furthermore, the ceasefire agreements explicitly prohibited such practices. Prior agreements specifically forbade the use of force in revenue collection, intimidation, and the disruption of economic activities.
In January 2026, Nagaland's Director General of Police, Rupin Sharma, IPS, reaffirmed the fundamental principle that no faction has the authority to abduct, summon, threaten, or detain citizens. He emphasized that such conduct violates both the law and established ground rules.
The choice, therefore, does not lie solely between upholding the ceasefire and ignoring the situation. Ordinary criminal law remains in effect regardless of ongoing political dialogue. Law enforcement authorities can investigate cases such as extortion, kidnapping, threats, and firearms offenses without suspending negotiations.
Would calling it off solve anything?
Terminating the ceasefire would send a clear message: negotiations are not indefinite, and civilians bear the consequences of factional armed conflict. Additionally, it would undermine the notion that organizational membership serves as a safeguard against legal accountability.
The risks, nevertheless, are significant. The 1997 ceasefire altered Nagaland’s security landscape, replacing prolonged armed conflict with negotiations. Abandoning this arrangement could reignite mobilization, military operations, displacement, and violence. Furthermore, it may exacerbate fragmentation, as factions rejecting a collective resolution might revert to clandestine activities.
Furthermore, there is no single ceasefire to be called off. The Centre maintains separate arrangements with multiple organizations. Agreements with the NSCN-K (Khango) and GPRN/NSCN factions have been renewed through 2027. The ceasefire with NSCN-K (Niki) was extended in September 2026 and remains valid until September 7, 2027. Using a unified slogan to lump them together obscures the complex and nuanced institutional landscape.
What, exactly, is still on the table?
This is where public clarity has failed. It is inaccurate to claim that the principal negotiators have secretly forsaken independence, sovereignty, or integration. As recently as 14 August 2026, NSCN (I-M) leader Th. Muivah reaffirmed that Naga sovereignty, a national flag, and a separate constitution remain core components of any settlement his organization will endorse. Additionally, the territorial integration of regions inhabited by Nagas has been thoroughly documented.
The NNPG position differs. Its leadership asserts that the negotiations from 2017 to 2019 have effectively concluded, and that the remaining tasks involve implementing the agreed constitutional framework.
This divergence in perspective itself constitutes a form of diagnosis. Currently, there is no single, publicly recognized negotiating stance on the Naga issue. Accordingly, citizens are justified in asking direct questions. Which aspects remain open to negotiation? What matters have already been resolved? Is sovereignty achievable? Is the pursuit of integration ongoing? What constitutional powers are under consideration? What are the prospects for the disarmament of armed organizations following a settlement? Furthermore, who holds the democratic mandate to represent the interests of all Nagas?
After almost thirty years, those questions cannot remain locked away in closed rooms.
One people, several political realities
The Nagas collectively preserve their history, culture, and political memory. Currently, they do not live under a unified constitutional framework. Nagas residing in Nagaland constitute the majority of the population in a state within the Indian Union. Those in Manipur inhabit the territory of Manipur. Additionally, Nagas are present in Arunachal Pradesh and Assam; further groups reside across the border in Myanmar.
Their difficulties overlap, but they are not identical. An arrangement that fits Nagaland cannot be transplanted to the Naga regions of Manipur. Matters concerning Arunachal or Assam inevitably involve those states and their non-Naga populations. The Government of India has informed Parliament that Assam, Manipur, and Arunachal Pradesh will be consulted before any settlement affecting them.
Consequently, there is a compelling argument for distinguishing a collective Naga identity from issues specific to individual states. Cultural collaboration does not necessarily require a uniform constitutional framework.
The opposing argument should be articulated with equal candor. Nationalist organizations are likely to view a state-by-state strategy as the disintegration of a movement whose historical justification rests on Naga unity that transcends current borders. Such disagreement ought to be subject to public debate rather than concealed behind vague phrasing.
Ambiguity is no longer a strategy
Peace constitutes an achievement. A ceasefire was never intended to evolve into a political system.
The fundamental decision goes beyond the slogans “keep it” and “end it.” The more critical assessments concern whether the discussions are guided by clear, measurable objectives; whether the established ground rules are followed; whether armed groups are held accountable under the law; and whether negotiators can articulate, in accessible language, the nature of the settlement they seek.
Multiple options are currently available: ending specific ceasefires where the rules consistently fail; maintaining and enforcing them without exception; setting deadlines; requiring the publication of negotiating objectives; or distinguishing questions about Nagaland from those about Nagas in Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, and Myanmar. Each option carries a cost.
The public can no longer tolerate indefinite uncertainty and coercion. A political organization seeking legitimacy cannot indefinitely demand unwavering sacrifice. The Government of India cannot regard the absence of open conflict as a resolution to a political issue.
There is an additional democratic anomaly. The elected government of Nagaland has acted more as a facilitator than as a negotiating party, despite representing the populace most directly affected by any settlement. Chief Minister Dr. Neiphiu Rio has stated that the State Government is not a direct participant in the negotiations. Religious institutions, tribal organizations, and civil society groups are significant; however, they cannot substitute for an Assembly and a government that derive their authority from electoral legitimacy. A lasting resolution that fundamentally redefines Nagaland’s constitutional or administrative future will require their inclusion; otherwise, it will likely face opposition.
After decades of negotiations, both parties now face a credibility assessment. They are required to clarify which issues remain unresolved, which agreements have already been reached, which goals are realistically attainable, and how this prolonged ceasefire is expected to lead to a settlement rather than ongoing postponement. A ceasefire should not be regarded as a definitive solution; rather, it represents a temporary pause. Such pauses are beneficial only when a responsible party eventually opens the door.
Besesayo Kezo, IPS, Retd. DGP