The Naga political journey—from the Naga Club memorandum of 1929 to the National Socialist Council of Nagalim and NNPG negotiations of today—has entered a phase where the problem is no longer articulation of identity.
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The Naga political journey—from the Naga Club memorandum of 1929 to the National Socialist Council of Nagalim and NNPG negotiations of today—has entered a phase where the problem is no longer articulation of identity, but the exhaustion of the language used to sustain it. What remains is not absence of politics, but repetition without arrival: solution, identity, framework, Yehzabo, flag, history.
This is the shift: Political positions persist, but they no longer produce resolution at the rate required. They circulate, repeat, and endure—with diminishing emotional force. What once moved toward an outcome now increasingly moves within itself.
In the late colonial moment of the 1930s–40s, under the retreating British Empire, political space was fluid. But the empire negotiated with structured entities, not dispersed village republics.
The Nagas entered modern politics without a form the system could fully recognise. By the time A.Z. Phizo articulated a unified Naga political claim in the late 1940s, the global and subcontinental political window had already begun to narrow.
The transition from colonial empire to nation-states was not an open field, but a structured negotiation dominated by interlocutors such as Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Jawaharlal Nehru, and Mahatma Gandhi. These personalities represented consolidated political formations capable of interfacing with empire through defined institutional and territorial frameworks.
The Naga assertion, emerging from dispersed village republics without a centralised state form, entered this moment structurally misaligned with the system that was deciding outcomes.
The Naga Plebiscite of 1951 expressed conviction with clarity—but within a world that had already shifted from formation to consolidation. The legal architecture of the postcolonial state had already been completed with the adoption of the Indian Constitution in 1949 and its enforcement on 26 January 1950. Territorial consolidation across the subcontinent, Goa by 1961 further reinforced the reality that recognition was now extended within fixed sovereign frames, not outside them.
What followed was not immediate rejection, but a long trajectory of partial engagement, where assertion persisted, but the window for foundational recognition quietly narrowed.
The 16-Point Agreement—leading to statehood in 1963 through the Naga People’s Convention—was not surrender, but self-actualisation: identity stabilised within constraint. But what followed was not resolution. It was suspension—an arrangement that managed contradiction without dissolving it.
From 'insurgency' in the 1960s–80s to the formation of the National Socialist Council of Nagalim in 1980, assertion and accommodation coexisted without convergence.
Over time, a policy shift emerged—from distance to proximity, from equidistance to equicloseness. Across administrations—from S. C. Jamir to Neiphiu Rio—this tension reflected structural limits, not merely leadership.
This enabled Thuingaleng Muivah’s 'insurgent diplomacy' after the 1997 ceasefire: sustained negotiation with the Government of India. The Framework Agreement 2015 captures this phase—movement without closure, engagement without finality.
But beneath this, a quieter condition has set in: 'fatigue'. Not collapse—but repetition without renewal. Sovereignty, solution, settlement, integration, autonomy, identity—these words still circulate, but with reduced capacity to resolve what they name. The political system continues to generate activity, but with declining ability to convert effort into outcome.
In lived terms, this appears as drift: overlapping authority, competing claims, administrative uncertainty, and growing disengagement. Not chaos—but diffusion without direction. Energy disperses. Convergence weakens. This is the transition—from politics of demand to politics of exhaustion.
It is at this point that the meaning of the “closing window” becomes precise. It is not abstract—it is the narrowing of the range of viable end-states the Naga process can still realistically reach across multiple dimensions of political possibility.
First, the space for maximalist sovereignty—full separation, independent constitutional order, or external recognition—is no longer structurally available. What remains is not its possibility, but its memory.
Second, expansive territorial reconfiguration by way of integration proposal, is closing under hardened state boundaries, competing claims, and security constraints. Negotiable ambiguity has increasingly become fixed geography.
Third, autonomy frameworks are narrowing as institutions solidify and political fatigue deepens. What once allowed creative asymmetry now operates within tighter administrative and legal limits.
Fourth, public patience is eroding, shifting legitimacy from historical claims to present performance and reducing tolerance for indefinite negotiation.
What remains, therefore, is a narrower band of possibility: deeper autonomy within the constitutional framework, symbolic recognition tied to functional governance, and clarity over completeness. In other words, the movement is from ideal resolution to workable settlement.
The real choice is no longer between idealism and surrender, but between anchored sufficiency and endless deferral. Anchored sufficiency builds within constraint—turning identity into institution and aspiration into workable form.
Beneath this lies a deeper rupture. The attempt to perfectly define identity—to align race, nationhood, and political form—becomes a trap. Identity does not sit still; it evolves and exceeds the structures built to contain it. Unlike creatures fixed by traits, human beings are not exhausted by labels. When identity is forced into rigid political form, it shrinks the very freedom it seeks to secure.
The task, then, is not to abandon identity, but to stop imprisoning it. A living identity within imperfect structures is still freedom. A perfect identity endlessly deferred is not. The Naga political moment now stands at a narrowing threshold—between closure and drift. The question is no longer whether the past was justified. It is whether the present can be concluded before repetition becomes permanence.
The final act required now is not louder assertion, but harder alignment—with reality, with limitation, and with the courage to bring a long journey to closure.
When we refuse to conclude a process, we do not keep it open in a neutral state. We simply stop controlling its direction while everything around it—institutions, demographics, governance, and social realities—continues to evolve and reshape the ground. In the end, the process may still reach a form of closure, but not one authored by those of us who delayed it. The outcome will arrive through accumulated drift and external forces, meaning the conclusion stands—but without our design, consent, or control. We have to permit closure. Because in the end, what is endlessly deferred is not preserved. It is diminished.
Limhachan Kikon
Dimapur