Employment guarantee law–MGNREGA—has been replaced with the Viksit Bharat-Guarantee for Rozgar and Ajeevika Mission (Gramin) Act, 2025 (VB-G RAM G).
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Public debate on public policy is not only natural but essential in a democracy. Laws that shape livelihoods—particularly for rural households—deserve the closest scrutiny. Yet such scrutiny must be grounded in a careful reading of what a new law actually provides, rather than in assumptions drawn from earlier frameworks or from what critics fear might be lost. Much of the criticism surrounding the Viksit Bharat – Guarantee for Rozgar and Ajeevika Mission (Gramin) Act, 2025 risks falling into this trap: diagnosing the failures of the past and attributing them, prematurely, to the reform itself.
The employment guarantee law enacted two decades ago played an important role in stabilising rural incomes and offering a measure of security during periods of distress. Its contribution during crises such as the Covid pandemic is rightly acknowledged. Over time, however, experience also revealed persistent structural weaknesses. Wage payments were frequently delayed, procedural barriers hollowed out unemployment allowance, access varied sharply across states, administrative capacity was uneven, and large-scale leakage occurred through fake job cards, inflated muster rolls, and low-quality asset creation. These were not marginal shortcomings; they were systemic.
The central question, therefore, is not whether reform was warranted, but whether the new framework meaningfully addresses these failures.
A common claim is that the debate has been reduced to a contest of acronyms, while substantive weaknesses continue unaddressed. In reality, the opposite is closer to the truth. The new Act focuses squarely on correcting delivery failures that undermined the credibility of the earlier framework. Verified worker registries replace vulnerable legacy systems; wage payments are placed on statutory timelines with automatic compensation for delays; procedural dis-entitlement clauses that rendered unemployment allowance ineffective in practice are removed; and grievance redressal is strengthened with clear timelines and accountability. These are not cosmetic changes. They address the operational fault lines that repeatedly eroded trust among workers.
Another criticism suggests that the employment guarantee has been “scrapped” and merely replaced with a new scheme that repeats old problems. This reading is inaccurate. The legal right to wage employment remains intact and justiciable. More importantly, the statutory entitlement has been expanded from 100 to 125 days. What has changed is the implementation architecture. The shift is from a fragmented, reactive model—often responding after distress has already set in—to a planned and enforceable framework designed to deliver work predictably. Addressing implementation failure through statutory reform is not repetition; it is correction.
Concerns about states with larger poor populations, such as Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, being least served under the earlier framework are well-founded—but they strengthen the case for reform rather than undermine it. Low penetration in these states was a documented failure of MGNREGA. An unplanned demand–response model favoured states with stronger administrative capacity, leaving others behind despite greater need and higher levels of migration. The new framework directly addresses this imbalance by anchoring employment generation in Viksit Gram Panchayat Plans, which integrate locally expressed demand with advance approval of works and assured funding. Uneven uptake was precisely why reform was necessary; preserving the earlier architecture would only have entrenched existing inequities. Further, normative allocations based on objective parameters introduce greater transparency and fairness in the distribution of resources across states.
Another line of criticism questions whether the expansion to 125 days is illusory because states must now bear a share of costs. This argument overlooks both precedent and safeguards. The Centre–State cost-sharing pattern follows long-established norms for centrally sponsored schemes, while North-Eastern and Himalayan states and Jammu & Kashmir continue under a more favourable 90:10 arrangement. More importantly, planning-based execution improves predictability of fund flows, reducing the ad-hocism that often-disrupted implementation earlier. Expansion of entitlement combined with shared responsibility reflects cooperative federalism, not dilution. Several nationally successful programmes—from rural roads to housing and drinking water—operate under similar arrangements.
Fiscally stressed states are often cited as likely casualties of the new framework. But fiscal stress alone does not determine exclusion. Under the earlier regime, exclusion frequently stemmed from weak planning, limited administrative capacity, and operational bottlenecks. The new Act seeks to mitigate these risks through advance, participatory and technology-enabled planning, reduced discretion to deny work once plans are approved, and strengthened transparency and accountability. Crucially, administrative expenditure has been enhanced from 6% to 9%, enabling states to build field capacity commensurate with the scale and ambition of the programme. State-specific challenges do not invalidate a national reform aimed at correcting systemic weaknesses.
Critics also note that several high-need states generated the fewest days of employment under the earlier framework, with only a small proportion of households ever reaching the statutory ceiling. This observation reinforces the case for reform rather than weakening it. The new framework will enable recorded demand be supported by approved works, predictable timelines, and a strengthened unemployment allowance. The objective is straightforward: to translate statutory entitlement into actual and reliable days of employment, particularly in regions that were historically underserved.
Much has also been made of the distinction between a “demand-driven” old scheme and a “supply-driven” new one. In practice, this distinction is overstated. The new framework does not suppress demand; it institutionalises it through planning, ensuring that demand is deliverable. A planned demand backed by assured resources is more empowering than an unfulfilled theoretical right.
The rights-based character of the employment guarantee, far from being weakened, is reinforced. Expansion to 125 days, enforceable wage-payment timelines, automatic compensation for delays, removal of dis-entitlement clauses, and appealable grievance redressal together enhance the practical value of the right to work. Rights matter most when they can be exercised without navigating administrative obstacles.
Even critics concede that implementation failures—corruption, fake job cards, inflated muster rolls, and poor asset quality—were the core weaknesses of the earlier framework. It is precisely these failures that the reform seeks to address through verified beneficiary systems, strengthened audits, and convergence-based asset creation. Acknowledging past failures is the justification for reform, not an argument against it.
Concerns regarding the limited pause window must also be seen in context. It is a labour-market safeguard designed to avoid distortion during peak agricultural seasons and does not reduce the statutory entitlement of 125 days. The provision reflects calibrated economic prudence—protecting incomes without undermining productive agricultural employment.
Taken together, much of the criticism diagnoses the failures of the old framework and then attributes those failures to the reform itself. The Viksit Bharat – Guarantee for Rozgar and Ajeevika Mission (Gramin) Act does not abandon the employment guarantee. It reinforces and expands it, with particular attention to the very weaknesses that limited effectiveness in high-need regions and among vulnerable workers. Reform here is not a retreat from social protection; it is an effort to make the promise of work real, predictable, and dignified.
Shailesh Kumar Singh
(The author is Secretary, Department of Rural Development, Government of India)