Naga Questions Simplified

Their concerns can include:

• protection of Naga identity and customary practices;

• land and traditional resource rights;

• political representation;

• administrative autonomy;

• preservation of Naga-inhabited areas;

• cultural and linguistic rights;

• security;

• economic development;

• and relations with neighboring communities.

This is where the concept of “integration” becomes particularly complicated. The Government of India itself has recognised the sensitivity of the matter. In parliamentary responses, it has stated that Assam, Manipur, and Arunachal Pradesh would be consulted before any final settlement affecting them.

That is a fundamental political reality. Nagas cannot negotiate away the constitutional interests of other states and their populations, just as those states cannot unilaterally determine the political aspirations of the Nagas living within their borders.

Consequently, the question of Nagas outside Nagaland requires a distinct negotiation framework.

Possible solutions might include enhanced autonomous institutions, cultural safeguards, customary-law protections, land and resource protections, representative mechanisms, and appropriate constitutional or statutory arrangements, depending on the circumstances in each area.

The crucial point is that Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh, and Assam should not necessarily be treated as a single administrative issue. The demographic situation, historical experience, and political relationships of the Nagas in each state differ.

3. Nagas in Myanmar

The third category is fundamentally different because it is an international question. Nagas living in northwestern Myanmar are not governed by India. They are citizens or residents of Myanmar and are subject to Myanmar's sovereignty, laws, military, and political institutions.

Their problems therefore include questions about:

• Myanmar's internal political conflict;

• ethnic autonomy and self-government;

• security;

• development and infrastructure;

• relations between Naga communities and the Myanmar state;

• relations with other ethnic nationalities;

• and the future political structure of Myanmar.

India cannot simply negotiate the political future of Naga communities in Myanmar on their behalf. Nor can Naga organisations in India assume that a solution negotiated with New Delhi automatically applies to Nagas on the other side of the international boundary.

This is where the international dimension of the Naga question must be distinguished from the Indian dimension. The international boundary may divide Naga communities along historical and cultural lines, but it does not erase their political identity.

The central danger: putting everything on one negotiating table

The argument becomes particularly compelling here. Suppose a negotiation simultaneously attempts to settle:

Nagaland's governance + Naga areas in Manipur + Naga areas in Arunachal Pradesh + Naga areas in Assam + Naga communities in Myanmar + sovereignty + territorial integration + constitutional arrangements + customary institutions.

The number of parties, constitutional questions, competing interests, and sovereign jurisdictions becomes enormous. Every solution to one problem can become an obstacle to another.

For example:

Greater territorial integration may be an important aspiration for some Nagas, but it immediately raises questions for the governments and populations of Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh, and Assam.

On the other hand, a settlement confined to Nagaland may be criticised by Nagas outside Nagaland who believe their political and cultural interests have been excluded. An international solution involving Nagas in Myanmar remains difficult because India cannot unilaterally determine Myanmar's constitutional future.

The result can be a negotiation process in which the definition of the problem continually expands faster than the ability to solve it. That is one reason negotiations can become protracted, repetitive, and politically exhausting.

Unity among the Naga people does not require identical solutions

There is an important distinction between Naga unity as a people and a single administrative solution for all Nagas.

The Nagas may legitimately maintain a shared historical consciousness, cultural ties, and an aspiration for political dignity, while acknowledging that different communities require different institutional arrangements. Indeed, insisting on a single solution may sometimes undermine the broader objective.

A more realistic formula would be:

One people, but differentiated solutions based on political and constitutional circumstances. That does not necessarily mean abandoning the idea of Naga unity. It means recognising the realities in which Naga unity must function.

The Nagaland government's own consultations have repeatedly emphasised the aspiration for a unified Naga voice and a “One Naga Family,” while also acknowledging divisions and the need for peaceful coexistence and democratic principles.

A possible three-track approach

The Naga political question might therefore be approached through three interconnected yet distinct tracks.

Track I — India–Nagaland

Deal principally with: Government of India ↔ Naga political groups ↔ Nagaland

Issues could include:

• political settlement;

• constitutional arrangements;

• customary institutions;

• security;

• demobilisation and rehabilitation;

• economic arrangements;

• relationship between Naga political institutions and the State;

• and democratic governance.

Track II — Naga areas outside Nagaland

Create a separate mechanism involving: Government of India ↔ concerned State Governments ↔ Naga representatives ↔ other affected communities

Here, the objective would be rights, autonomy, identity, development, and peaceful coexistence, rather than assuming that territorial change is the only possible solution. This distinction is especially important because the Government of India has explicitly acknowledged the need to consult the governments and stakeholders in Assam, Manipur, and Arunachal Pradesh.

Track III — Nagas in Myanmar

This should principally involve: Naga representatives ↔ Myanmar authorities/ethnic political actors, with India playing whatever diplomatic, humanitarian, or peace-supporting role is appropriate.

India's relationship with Myanmar can facilitate dialogue, but India cannot negotiate away Myanmar's sovereignty.

Separation does not mean abandonment

This is perhaps the most important qualification. Separating the problems should not mean telling Nagas in Manipur, Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, or Myanmar that they are on their own.

It means establishing mechanisms to address their concerns without making every issue hostage to every other.

A settlement for Nagaland could be accompanied by parallel guarantees and mechanisms for Naga communities elsewhere.

Similarly, progress for Naga communities outside Nagaland need not wait indefinitely for the resolution of the entire Naga political question. This would turn an enormous and seemingly indivisible problem into a series of negotiable problems.

What should happen before the next major discussion?

Both Naga leaders and the Government of India would benefit from agreeing first on a problem-definition document.

Before negotiating solutions, they should agree:

1. What exactly is the problem?

2. Who are the parties to each problem?

3. Which issues are within India's constitutional jurisdiction?

4. Which issues belong to individual state governments?

5. Which issues concern Nagaland specifically?

6. Which issues concern Naga communities outside Nagaland?

7. Which issues have an international dimension involving Myanmar?

8. Which questions can be settled immediately?

9. Which require long-term negotiations?

10. Which objectives are aspirations rather than immediately achievable political demands?

This would introduce something that has often been missing from the Naga discourse: a hierarchy of achievable objectives.

The Government of India characterised the 2015 Framework Agreement as establishing overarching principles within which a conclusive agreement would be formulated. The pertinent lesson for any subsequent process is that expansive political language must ultimately be translated into concrete institutions, responsibilities, timelines, and mechanisms for implementation.

But there is an important danger in excessive separation

There is also a counterargument. If the problems are fully compartmentalised, Naga political organisations may lose their negotiating leverage, and the broader historical question may gradually fragment into smaller administrative issues.

That could produce:

Nagaland → one settlement;

Manipur → separate local arrangements;

Arunachal Pradesh → separate arrangements;

Assam → separate arrangements;

Myanmar → another process.

Some Nagas might view that as a gradual abandonment of the idea of a broader Naga political identity. Therefore, the answer is not separation without coordination.

It is: Separate negotiations, coordinated strategy.

There should perhaps be an overarching Naga political council or consultative mechanism to safeguard the Naga people's shared historical, cultural, and political interests while enabling different negotiating teams to address distinct jurisdictions.

That would preserve unity of purpose without demanding uniformity of solution.

The deeper lesson

The Naga movement has long been remarkably resilient, but endurance is not the same as political effectiveness. After decades of conflict and negotiations, the greatest danger now may not be a lack of political ideas but the inability to translate broad aspirations into actionable arrangements.

The Government of India has itself described the Naga issue as persisting for decades, while the 2015 agreement and subsequent negotiations were intended to establish a framework for a settlement. The next stage, therefore, requires something different from another round of purely rhetorical negotiations. It requires political engineering.

Comment

The Nagas ought to refrain from the temptation to amalgamate every grievance into a single, extensive historical inquiry. A problem becomes more manageable when its scope is distinctly delineated.

Similarly, the Government of India ought to resist the temptation to limit the Naga issue solely to the administration of Nagaland. The historical and political aspirations of the Nagas extending beyond Nagaland cannot be disregarded or dismissed.

The wiser formula is: One Naga history, three political theaters, differentiated solutions, and a unifying vision.

Nagaland requires an Indian constitutional and political settlement. Nagas elsewhere in India require rights, safeguards, representation, autonomy, and peaceful coexistence within their respective states. Nagas in Myanmar require an appropriate Myanmar-related political and diplomatic process.

These questions are related but not identical.

If Nagas insist that all three must be solved simultaneously, they may spend another generation debating the problem without resolving any part of it. If New Delhi insists that only one part exists, it will perpetuate the historical grievance that sparked the conflict.

The true statesmanship, therefore, lies in finding the middle path: Do not abandon the broader Naga vision—but do not make it a precondition for solving every smaller, immediate, and achievable problem.

That may be the most pragmatic approach to transition from the politics of “one problem, one solution” to “one people, several practical solutions, and a common future.”

Besesayo Kezo,

IPS, Retd DGP.