Manipur’s Ethnic Fault Lines and the Question of Shared Governance

Manipur’s continuing ethnic strife has exposed a deep structural crisis in the state’s governance model. The democratic majoritarian rule in a pluralistic society in Manipur has empowered the dominant community in appropriating the lion’s share of resources, institutions, and infrastructure while ignoring equity for the minority tribes. Imbalance in developmental growth and prosperity coupled with the inability of the politicians to deal with the questions of equity— equity in resources and infrastructure deployment, institutional support for governance, political power sharing at the council of ministers level, and empowerment of the Hill Areas Committee— are some of the major issues confronting the state.

The violent conflict between the Meitei community and Zo (Chin, Kuki, Mizo) ethnic group since May 2023 has polarised society and shattered illusions of an inclusive and impartial state. Six months into President’s Rule, yet it has not been able to bring back elected representatives and bureaucrats, etc., which make up 16% of the population, to participate in the legislative, political, administrative, and judicial processes at the state’s capital, Imphal. The banishment of the Zo (Chin, Kuki, Mizo) ethnic group has tilted the administrative equation heavily in favour of the dominant community, and a very strong Meitei-centric bias seems to be emerging, as seen in the 18th September 2025 notification issued by the Land Resources Department, government of Manipur. The Meiteis have always been politically dominant, and now, with the banishment of the Zo (Chin, Kuki, Mizo) ethnic group, the dominant community seems to have marginalised the tribes of Manipur completely and gained total ascendancy in both political and bureaucratic power, eclipsing the tiny presence of 10 Naga MLAs and very few Naga top bureaucrats and officials in Imphal. What is perplexing is the lack of urgency on the part of the Meitei community and the Naga tribes to pressurise the state government for facilitating the return of the Zo (Chin, Kuki, Mizo) ethnic group to participate in the legislature and government. It is in their own interest to restore normalcy at the earliest. The continuing absence of a part of Manipur’s society in the capital is wrong and unacceptable and should not continue indefinitely.

Beneath the churning in society lies a slow-burning political question: can Manipur remain a unified entity without fundamentally restructuring systemic changes in how resources, institutions, major infrastructure, and political power are shared between the valley and hill populations?

The Meitei demand for ST status, purportedly a quest for identity preservation and reservation in government jobs which currently restrict non-tribals from acquiring land in the hills, is widely seen by tribal communities as a calculated move to bypass land protections under Article 371-C and the Manipur Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act (MLR&LR Act,1960). The demand for ST status is persisting regardless of the fact that the Meiteis are already classified as SC and OBC. Desire to possess tribal lands in “hill areas” is the main target of the dominant community, and anything concerning land has always been troublesome, as witnessed around the world right now in Ukraine and Gaza.

Inter-tribal fragmentation, particularly the historic rivalry between Naga and Kuki communities, has prevented a unified tribal front. The Meitei political class, with its entrenched access to state power and resources, has capitalised on this disunity, reinforcing a de facto “divide and rule” equilibrium. While Nagas are pinning their hopes on the long-pending Naga Framework Agreement, the Zo (Chin, Kuki, Mizo) ethnic group, devastated by recent ethnic violence, is demanding a separate administration. It is indeed sad to witness the two tribal groups hopelessly disunited when faced with the challenge of losing everything to the dominant community, including political power, administrative participation, and tribal land in “hill areas”. Statistics are very clear. The Meiteis, who dominate the tribes, represent more than 50% of the state’s population, while the combined tribes are 41%. The population equation may change in the census of 2027 in favour of the backward tribes as they have been growing at a faster rate in each census compared to the advanced Meitei community, and the narrowing of the population gap may not be received well by the dominant community. In fact, the current conflict has an element related to population phobia of losing political control, and unfortunately, mixed with other elements of demand for ST status, drug business, fear of illegal migrants, etc., provided fuel to the current ethnic conflict. The need for unity of the two tribal groups cannot be played down, even if it is unpalatable, and has to happen as it is in their best interest for a brighter future of both the marginalised tribes.

A more decisive shift in the balance of power may be looming on the horizon, not through political negotiations, but through shifting demographic dynamics. India’s next decadal Census is expected in 2027, and with delimitation slated to follow in 2028–29, the population dynamics between the valley and hills could reshape political equations. In each census, the tribal population, especially in the “hill areas”, has shown faster growth largely due to factors such as relative backwardness, remoteness, and higher fertility rates. If this trend continues, the delimitation exercise could result in increased representation, narrowing the margin of assembly seats between the valley and “hill areas”, and could position the Muslim MLAs as kingmakers. This aspect needs to be watched closely as the “hill areas” have already lost about three assembly seats as delimitation exercise, based on population data of the 2001 Census and directed by the Supreme Court, has not been implemented so far. Ironically, the constitutional mechanism of delimitation meant to ensure democratic fairness may be viewed as a threat by those who have long benefited from the status quo.

Against this backdrop, the proponents for inclusion of “hill areas” under the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution offer a possible middle path viewed against the demand for a separate administration, which could be a Union Territory (UT) or a State. Such a proposal would allow for the creation of Autonomous District Councils (ADCs) with legislative powers over land, resources, and local governance, without altering Manipur’s territorial boundaries.

Yet skepticism remains, as many tribal communities in “hill areas” fear that even such constitutional safeguards will be diluted or bypassed under a state government perceived as hegemonic and partial. It is this trust deficit that is pushing tribal groups, particularly among the Zo (Chin, Kuki, Mizo) ethnic group, towards calls for separation, whether in the form of a separate administration, statehood, or union territory status. While these demands were once seen as fringe, they are rapidly gaining ground in the hill districts and becoming mainstream discourse because of the relentless hegemonic attempts made by the dominant community.

Would the Manipur society comprising the three broad communities, the Meiteis, Nagas, and Zo (Chin, Kuki, Mizo) ethnic group, be able to imagine a federated vision of governance?

The real test for Manipur, and for the Indian Union more broadly, is whether a federated vision of governance as already provided in the Constitution under Article 244(2) and Article 244-A for Bodoland Territorial Council be imagined and implemented for the “hill areas” of Manipur?

The answer is Yes! After all, there is nothing new in this proposal as four states in the northeastern states, namely Assam, Meghalaya, Mizoram, and Tripura, have the federated system of governance in the form of the Sixth Schedule.

The federated governance recognises the distinct identities, needs, and aspirations of its communities, without defaulting to majoritarian control or fragmentation of the state. Such a vision would include:

(1) Meaningful tribal autonomy for autonomous district councils under Article 244(2) and Article 244-A with powers to make laws on tribal land, local resources, customary practices, including strengthening of the village authorities and its laws;

(2) political autonomy with guaranteed fiscal, administrative, and police powers for district councils;

(3) political safeguards that protect tribal interests in power-sharing in the Council of Ministers and allocation of major portfolios to ministers representing “hill areas”;

(4) strengthening of existing mechanisms and functions to the Hill Areas Committee, including its role for inter-community dialogue and reconciliation; and

(5) a central government that is seen as impartial, rather than aligned with dominant interests.

The crisis in Manipur can no longer be viewed as episodic violence warranting short-term reactions from the state government. The malaise that is the widening chasm in society calls for institutionalising systemic changes in governance to promote coexistence. The asymmetries that exist between the valley and “hill areas” in resource sharing, institutional governance, namesake political power sharing, insecurities over tribal land ownership and customary practices in “hill areas,” etc., can be addressed under President’s Rule, which is expected to dispense impartial and neutral administration. The demand made by Ladakhis is clear, i.e. declaring Ladakh as a tribal area, extending the Sixth Schedule, and granting statehood. People in Manipur are aware of the strong nexus between Delhi and Imphal, and if the power centres are serious about resolving the Manipur crisis, they can come out with their proposition and start the ball rolling. Regardless of grandstanding by different communities, realistic consideration will make them sober and mellow down for considering pragmatic offers made by the central government.

Ngaranmi Shimray

New Delhi