Manipur ethnic conflict that erupted between the Meitei and Kuki-Zo communities on 3rd May 2023 has gradually evolved into two distinct security situations.
The ethnic conflict that erupted on 3rd May 2023 has gradually evolved into two distinct security situations. Churachandpur district has experienced relative calm, interrupted occasionally by incidents along the Bishnupur border, while Kangpokpi district has continued to witness recurring violence affecting neighbouring Naga villages and major highways. These contrasting patterns raise important questions about the differing strategies adopted by Kuki armed outfits operating in the two districts.
The relative calm in Churachandpur has been punctuated by periodic incidents along the Bishnupur border, where violence has largely remained centred on the Meitei-Kuki conflict. In contrast, Kangpokpi district has witnessed repeated attacks affecting Naga villages bordering Ukhrul, Kamjong, Senapati and Noney districts, as well as frequent disruptions along the National Highways connecting Imphal with Dimapur and Imphal with Ukhrul. To many political observers, these differing patterns suggest two distinct operational approaches; maintaining pressure on the Meitei community through periodic violence in the Bishnupur sector while simultaneously targeting vulnerable Naga villages situated along the borders of Kangpokpi district as part of what they describe as an expansionist strategy.
Political observers have also pointed to reports of Kuki villages relocating from parts of Kamjong district into Kangpokpi district. If verified, such movements could contribute to a greater concentration of the Kuki population in strategically important inter-district border areas. Whether these relocations are spontaneous, security-driven or part of a broader political strategy remains a matter requiring careful and objective examination.
The demographic composition of the two districts may also help explain these contrasting developments. According to the 2011 Census, Kangpokpi district has an estimated population comprising approximately 58% Kuki/Thadou, 25% Naga, and 17% Nepali, Meitei and Hindi-speaking communities. Given this demographic profile and the mixed nature of settlements along its borders, some analysts argue that repeated attacks on Naga villages are intended to alter the demographic balance by displacing Naga communities and consolidating Kuki control over strategically important areas.
Churachandpur district, together with Pherzawl, presents a markedly different demographic profile. Roughly two-thirds of its population comprises Paite, Hmar, Zou, Kom, Vaiphei and other Chin-Zo tribes, many of whom do not identify themselves as Kuki or Thadou, while Kukis/Thadou constitute slightly more than one-third of the population. These districts are therefore generally viewed as representing the broader Chin-Zo ethnic group rather than being dominated by a single tribe. This demographic diversity may partly explain why the pattern of violence witnessed in Kangpokpi has not been replicated across most parts of Churachandpur and Pherzawl, although areas adjoining Bishnupur have remained particularly sensitive.
Some political analysts further argue that the continuing violence in the Kuki-majority district of Kangpokpi reflects a broader strategic objective of establishing territorial continuity between Kangpokpi and Churachandpur through portions of Senapati and Noney districts, as well as parts of Ukhrul and Kamjong districts. According to this interpretation, repeated attacks on Naga villages are intended to facilitate demographic consolidation and territorial expansion. Whether such a long-term objective exists remains a matter of political debate, but it has become one of the principal explanations advanced by several commentators seeking to understand the recurring violence in the district border regions.
The modern Kuki political movement gained momentum during the late 1980s with the emergence of armed groups, eventually leading to the signing of the Suspension of Operations (SoO) Agreement with the Government of India in 2008. In December 2016, the Congress government led by O. Ibobi Singh created Kangpokpi district despite strong opposition from several Naga organisations. Some critics argue that the creation of a Kuki-majority district strengthened Kuki political confidence and altered the strategic dynamics of the region. They further contend that the concentration of SoO camps in Kangpokpi, close to Naga-majority districts, has provided armed cadres with greater operational access to sensitive border areas, thereby increasing tensions. These allegations, however, require impartial verification.
The SoO arrangement itself has increasingly come under public scrutiny. Critics contend that while the agreement succeeded in ending direct hostilities between Kuki militant groups and the security forces, it has not prevented repeated violence against neighbouring communities. They further argue that inadequate enforcement of the Revised Ground Rules by the Ministry of Home Affairs has weakened the credibility of the SoO Agreement. Particular attention has been drawn to the perceived inaction of the Joint Monitoring Group (JMG), the body responsible for monitoring compliance with the agreement. The absence of visible action against alleged violations has fuelled growing public concern regarding the effectiveness of the monitoring mechanism.
With the Manipur Assembly elections approaching, some political commentators have also speculated that electoral considerations may partly explain the reluctance of the Ministry of Home Affairs to take stronger action against alleged violations of the SoO Revised Ground Rules. No official evidence has been presented to substantiate this allegation. Nevertheless, the perception has become part of the wider political debate surrounding the conflict.
Unlike Manipur, Nagaland has largely remained peaceful for Kuki settlers. However, recent disagreements with the Chakhroma Angamis over customary land ownership and differing interpretations of the historical landlord-tenant relationship have generated fresh tensions. This was followed by reports that around 80 Kuki youths, including two who were reportedly involved in the recent tensions, joined a Naga armed group. Since Kukis are not Nagas, their recruitment has generated unease within sections of Naga society, and several voices have reportedly expressed concern. Whether these concerns will influence future recruitment policies remains to be seen.
Many of the recent confrontations appear to stem from competing claims over land ownership, territorial control, and differing interpretations of customary rights between Kuki groups and indigenous communities. Resolving these disputes without further bloodshed will require sincere political dialogue involving all stakeholders, accompanied by impartial enforcement of the law. Equally important will be the constructive role of the churches and civil society in promoting reconciliation, building trust, and encouraging a durable political settlement with the Government of India.
Ngaranmi Shimray