The United States Defense Department published a report titled “Energy Futures in Asia” in early 2000s calling for strategic shift from Atlantic to eastern part of the globe. The strategic shift gives birth to “Pivot to Asia” engaging with eastern Asian nations.
To align New Delhi’s interest with 21st Century geopolitical play of the United States, the Modi government tread a step further in rechristening a lukewarm ‘Look East’ to a more fanciful ‘Act East’. The shift, at least in thinking, is masqueraded as a mere commercial expansion to India’s strategic partners positioned to the South of China. However, the latent propelling force behind New Delhi’s assertive adventure is comparable to Washington’s Pivot to Asia whose subject of interest is to rebalance Beijing’s influence in resource-rich South China Sea and Indian Ocean.
With the exception of tiny Bhutan, all of India’s neighbours in the subcontinent including Pakistan, Nepal, Myanmar, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka have consented to be the parties to ambitious Belt & Road Initiative (BRI) of China. This Initiative circumvents India on two fronts – Economic belt (land) and Maritime road (sea). The economic belt (land-route) connects mainland China with eastern Europe via central Asia, terming as high-speed transport corridor across Eurasia. On the maritime front, starting from Far East China, the route passes through Indian Ocean connecting Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives and exits at Tanzania (Africa).
Beijing asserted that the BRI project is peaceful and commercial in nature considering its overcapacity production and accumulated capitals in recent decades where prospective markets are required to invest. The project, however, is specifically designed as a geopolitical construction in response to America’s military “re-balancing” of Asia. In the show of might by two military powers, New Delhi is placed in a situation “a move doubles the other”; a locus where aligning with either will reverse relative balance.
Excepting vital military installations in its assisted-developing (or logistically shared) ports around the Indian Ocean, Beijing’s String of Pearls strategy is but an additional concern for New Delhi. The String linking Sittwe (Myanmar), Chittagong (Bangladesh), Hambantota (Sri Lanka), Gwadar (Pakistan) and Maroa (Maldives) poses a security threat to India forming a security triangle against India. In the event of escalation of tension between the two Asian giants, Beijing could turn the ports it has assisted in development into its favour since Beijing’s approach to the projects is aggressive making sure that it gets its share.
New Delhi’s strained relationship with Islamabad was further burdened by ground-progress of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). A subsidiary of BRI, the CPEC’s main agenda is to lay pipelines and develop Express Ways while New Delhi accused it of disregarding India’s territorial integrity. The progress of the corridor will inhibit New Delhi’s access to Central Asia, especially Afghanistan which India stakes high claim as is testified by its recent entry into Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).
Notwithstanding the above strategic concerns around its surroundings, New Delhi’s style of dealing with its neighbours is infructuous. Nepal has seen drifting towards Red Giant in recent developments largely because of New Delhi’s preferential treatment to Nepal’s Medhesis (geographically closer to India) leaving a room for the Hill-based elites to turn to Beijing. Political developments in Nepal construe that government runs with Beijing backed political leaders. To lose an ancient ally in a most needed exigency only exemplifies incongruent foreign policy by Delhi-based elites.
Sino-Myanmar relation has witnessed a new leap in what could strategically be interpreted as a blow to Act East policy. United Wa State Army (UWSA) has assumed an aggressive approach in Myanmar’s 21st Century Panglong Peace Union Conference explicitly with the blessing of Beijing. China then covertly fuel conflict in this troubled nation and has now effectively backed Naypyidaw’s initiated talks on possible United States of Myanmar using the puppet UWSA. On the other extreme, there is no active participation from Myanmar’s western neighbour.
Moving southward, end of president Rajapaksa era coincidentally marked the unstable relationship between Beijing and Colombo. The locals having registered discontentment against the development of a port (Hambantota) giving leeway to Chinese demands, India has been presented with a golden opportunity to reign in over the political crevice its extreme southern neighbour has projected. However, New Delhi still struggles to capitalise it.
Tension seems mounting between Beijing and New Delhi at the tri-junction of Sikkim-China-Bhutan, especially at the Doklam plateau. Beijing accused New Delhi of provocative renovation and construction of new bunkers while the later accused former of expansion of ‘strategic width’ for the present standoff. Successful mission in safeguarding China’s interest in Doklam plateau would squeeze India’s strategic Siliguri Corridor, also aptly known as ‘Chicken’s Neck’, a narrow passage connecting mainland India with its restive Northeast region and Southeast Asia.
At domestic front, the situation depicts nothing better. Promoting nationalism at the cost of national interest along with misinterpretation of voices of anti-government as anti-nationalism in a clandestine move to silence rationalism has held constructive federation to a ransom. Dissent is sedition and liberalism challenged. Centre’s muscular intervention in conflict-torn Kashmir and movement for separate Gorkhaland has only accelerated confrontationist ideology, indicating a slow shift from our valued ideal of traditional conflict resolution modelled on negotiation, concession and trust. Violence has become a preferred instrument of our state craft today.
India was once projected as a brotherly figure by the surrounding nations, assuming dynamic regional leadership by rendering democratically seasoned direction to the infant democracies or even junta-ruled nations around her rims. Albeit largely incomplete, India formerly portrayed a receptive image commanding respect from its regional countries. The political scenario today is completely diametrical to its avowed principles. Politics of cow slaughter, gau rakshaks, anti-Romeo squads, suppression of dissent, state-regulated food habit, weakening federative spirit etcetera have dominated international news columns.
India’s successful circumvention of China’s aggressive approach lies in building trust at home front while reaching out to her rim-nations who are skeptical and equally unreceptive to Beijing’s BRI program. America under Trump having had re-oriented its direction to ‘America First’ policy – evidenced by its soft stance in South China Sea upon which Act East strategically premised – for the time being, New Delhi should no longer hope to fundamentally derive its source of power from perceived world powers. It will continue to run from pillar to post with no allies that India can rely on. Creation of not Hindu state nor strictures in personal liberty but nurturing diversified talents to deploy at various fronts is the need of the hour.
