[dropcap]W[/dropcap]hen external affairs minister Sushma Swaraj flew to Dhaka this past Wednesday, hawk-eyes from the Northeast followed her, largely because of the controversy around a reported move to allow visa-free entry to Bangladeshi nationals of a certain age group. In Dhaka, Swaraj offered much less: five-year multiple entry visas to Bangladeshi nationals below 13 and above 65 years of age against the current practice of multiple entry for one year; 100 MW extra power from the Palatana project over and above the 500 MW already being supplied across the Behrampore-Bheramara grid connection; increased frequency of the Maitree Express and more AC coaches and a direct but service from Dhaka to the north-eastern states of Meghalaya and Assam. These were part of multiple confidence-building measures that India is adopting to resurrect bilateral relationship with the neighbouring country after failing to deliver on its earlier promises to ratify a key land swap pact and an agreement on Teesta water sharing. India’s foreign office insisted the issues of visa-free entry and visa on arrival for Bangladeshi nationals were not among the topics of discussion.The land boundary agreement (LBA), signed during prime minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Dhaka in September 2011, was cleared by the UPA government in February 2013 but failed to get past Parliament because of opposition by the BJP. The LBA, which requires a constitutional amendment, sparked off widespread protests in Assam and some other parts of Northeast. Under the agreement, India were give up claims over 17,000 acres of land that were to be transferred to Bangladesh and Dhaka were to cede 7,000 acres, which would join the Indian territory. Bangladesh has already ratified the pact. The land-swap agreement were to give citizenship rights to over 52,000 stateless people: 37,000 on the Bangladesh side and close to 15,000 on the Indian side. The Teesta water-sharing deal is stuck because of opposition from the Mamata Banerjee government in West Bengal.
Both pacts were part of UPA government’s showcase foreign policy initiative with the eastern neighbour, which was seen to be increasingly leaning towards China largely because of a perception problem with New Delhi. It was thought that the two landmark deals would end a historical thorn and open a new era in bilateral relationship between New Delhi and Dhaka. The LBA was a dominant issue in Bangladeshi politics and prime minister Sheikh Hasina’s scheme of things. Hasina had even sent her foreign minister to India last year to woo the BJP in a last-ditch effort to achieve a pre-election boost for herself.
Often New Delhi’s policies with regard to Bangladesh have met with hurdles because they were formulated without taking the sensibilities of the Northeastern region into account or because of misinformation and propaganda for political mileage. The region, inhabited largely by myriad tribal groups and which shares a significant portion of its geographical boundary with Bangladesh, has been facing a steady and large-scale influx of migrants from across the border for decades now, that has changed the demography and created a threat perception among the smaller ethnic groups. The numerous agitations and terrorist movements for independent homelands, separate states and autonomous regions and regular bloody ethnic conflicts have their roots in this insecurity and identity crisis that the tribal groups experience in the face of the surging influx. This is what politicians feast on. The illegal migrants issue has been the dominant election issue for over four decades now.
Many a foreign policy analysts and SAARC-belt watchers have opined that the land-swap deal can actually benefit the Northeast region and Assam, as it would enable India to secure the border more effectively, allow New Delhi the much-needed leg room to raise at the diplomatic level the issue of Bangladeshi migration, which can only grow in the days to come as climate change increases the challenges for that country. In fact, this land belt is said to be a hot spot for smuggling of food, livestock and drugs from India to Bangladesh and for illegal immigration of Bangladeshis to India.
The visa-free entry issue is another instance when politicians tried to ply it on local sentiments to score politically. Assam chief minister Tarun Gogoi first raised the issue to try and corner the BJP, which made huge political gains in the national elections in Northeast by vowing to send back the illegal Bangladeshi migrants. That, unfortunately boomeranged on Gogoi, when it was revealed that the visa-free entry and visa-on-arrival schemes were actually part of a series of proposals that the foreign office had prepared after discussions with the home ministry during the UPA government to demonstrate Delhi’s ‘goodwill’ to Dhaka after the LBA and Teesta treaty fiascos. The idea to extend the initiative to Bangladesh actually originated way back in January 2013. The plan for visa-on-arrival was not implemented partly because New Delhi wanted to verify if states were comfortable with the idea.
But then, ideas like visa-on-arrival or multiple entry visa or even visa-free entry need to be looked at through the lens of logic rather than emotion, sensation and suspicion. Mind you, unlike illegal migrants, people emigrating by using a visa or even without a visa would be documented immigrants, and thus far removed from the problem we fear. On the other hand, this can open up a host of possibilities from drawing tourists, businessmen and investors to even visits by relatives of migrants settled in the region, who might otherwise take the wrong route or even think of shifting permanently to this side of the border. A host of Bangladesh-manufactured goods already flood the Northeast market and easier entry barriers can open possibilities for both sides. Better ties with Bangladesh can revive the moribund South Asia Growth Quadrangle (SAGQ), comprising the Northeast, Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan, which holds a lot of possibility for the economically backward region. Once economic ties take deep roots, even Dhaka will have its hands tied to address seriously the irritant of illegal migration, which the country doesn’t readily recognise till now. Several economists and Northeast watchers have long floated the idea of offering work permits to the illegal Bangladeshi migrants to legitimise their stay without conferring them the rights of an India citizen, thus securing the politico-economic interests of the ethnic population. The northeastern region can, in turn, use that labour force to fuel a manufacturing boom to cater to the neighbouring markets. Any permanent solution to the issue of illegal Bangladeshi migration will have to have the grounding in these ideas. It’s high time the people of Northeast stop being myopic, begin to see through the politics of illegal migration and recognise the realities in order to turn this adversity to their benefit.
