D Suba Chandran
[dropcap]T[/dropcap]HE recent firing by the Border Security Force (BSF) in the Ramban district of Jammu and Kashmir on a civilian protest movement was generally perceived as an “overreaction” by the BSF, to a “peaceful” protest by an “unarmed” civilian mob. Is that all to the firing? Should we consider this as another “unfortunate” event in J&K, forget and pretend that the condition is usual? And fool ourselves that the environment in J&K is “normal”?What is the BSF doing in Ramban district? The first and foremost question is undoubtedly the presence of a “Border” security force in Ramban district. However, it does not make sense to criticise or blame the BSF for firing at a group of civilians; the BSF by ethos, training and objective is not like the State police, or the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF). The philosophy behind raising a separate Border Security Force as a paramilitary is to guard and patrol the borders of India. As such, they are not and should not be trained to be deployed in civilian areas.
But the larger question here is not the presence of the BSF; rather, the absence of governance process, especially in the interior districts of J&K. Are the State and Union governments abdicating the responsibility to govern and make the police and paramilitaries a scapegoat?
Not yet normal
In both the regions of J&K, the interior districts such as Ramban, Doda and Rajouri in the Jammu region are yet to “feel” and “experience” “normalcy” in terms of daily activities — from better roads, teachers and doctors in their respective institutions, and more importantly electricity (at least to charge the batteries!). While militancy and the movement of terrorists have drastically declined in these districts, thanks to the local police, the paramilitary and the military, the governance process has not moved in yet, as it has happened in Jammu and Srinagar districts. Relatively, the districts of Jammu and Srinagar are much ahead.
While on paper, every district in J&K receives substantial developmental funds, in practice it always remains a mystery. There is a huge criminal gap between what is on the paper and what is visible on the ground in these districts. While Jammu and Srinagar districts have always been politically active, the political elite ensure that there is adequate expenditure at the ground level. Unfortunately, the political elite in these districts are not only narrow, but also selfish and corrupt. As a result, despite corruption and governance issues, institutions do function in the urban districts; the same cannot be said about the rural J&K. The leadership in Jammu, Srinagar and New Delhi is perfectly aware of this issue, and address the same only by ignoring it, or maintaining a silence.
As a result, there is an anti-State sentiment in the interior areas and is bound to erupt, even at the slightest provocation. But this anti-State sentiment in the districts under discussion is not erected on an “Azadi” base as is the case in Srinagar and its surrounding districts, but on a “you failed us and take us for granted” anger and frustration. All one needs to understand this reality is to travel on his/her own or in the cramped Tata Sumos, as a normal citizen. Neither the officials nor the political elite understand this as they travel in official vehicles with a red light on the top and a pilot ahead and a protection following. When you have a security man armed with an AK-47 even while jogging on a university campus, what connections are you likely to have with the rest of “civil” society, which has the luxury of living primarily with pain and frustration?
Azadi sentiment
While a section of the political leadership and the media screamed the violence in Ramban as an expression of “Azadi” sentiment spreading outside the Valley, the separatists and others in the Valley tried to exploit and usurp the problems and sentiments in Ramban. A section within the Valley may want to believe that there is a larger Azadi sentiment in Doda and Ramban districts; but that will only undermine the real reasons for anger and frustration not only in Doda and Ramban, but also in Rajouri and Poonch districts.
The problem in Ramban was not the BSF. The actual firing only triggered an already bottled-up frustration in the district. The hard truth that neither the leadership in New Delhi nor in J&K wants to know is the frustration at the ground level. All these years, there was militancy as an excuse for the State not performing; if the Union and State governments are repeatedly underlining that normalcy has returned, why are the institutions not performing?
The next set of questions, beyond the Ramban killings should be: are there other sentiments — religious and communal, being erected over the governance deficit? The civil society and the State will have to ask these two serious questions — in terms of what is happening in the interior districts — especially Doda, Ramban, Rajouri and Poonch. Failure to find the right answers and correct the course will impinge everyone in the long run, and completely rupture the social fabric between the societies and within them. Is the religion likely to divide the communities more, rather than unite them? Is it time that we look beyond being politically correct in J&K, and call a spade a spade?
First, is there a hardening of sentiment in the Muslim community in these districts, especially after the increase in the Hindu Yatras — the main one being the Amarnath, and its subsidiaries — spanning from the Budha Amarnath temple in Poonch to the Machel in Kishtwar district? There is a substantial gap between the two communities from Kishtwar to Poonch towns along the Pir Panjal, where both communities co-habit, along with Gujjars and Bakerwals.
While the ST status to the Gujjars is slowly increasing their economic situation, where the parents and youths are relatively secure about their future, the other two communities are apprehensive of their future, given the lack of opportunities. In a given closed environment, the absence of governance and fear about the future are likely to pit one section against the other. The minority Hindu communities in these regions are using the multiple yatras to assert their larger identity; there has been a drastic increase in the last decade in not only the Amarnath Yatra, but also the multiple smaller ones covering from Poonch to Kishtwar.
Tourism and peace
It was very unfortunate, starting with the former Governor SK Sinha, the governments made the success of the Amarnath Yatra as a sign of return of normalcy to J&K. Tourism became a yardstick in measuring peace in J&K. It is equally unfortunate that a section within the Muslim community in these districts sees this as a larger State conspiracy against them.
When societies are inward looking due to geography and the failure to provide adequate outlets — emotionally and physically — they are bound to live by fear. And when they do, facts and the larger truths behind them become the first casualty. Suspicion and hatred become facts and figures.
Secondly, in these districts, there is a slow, but steady revision taking place within the nature of Islam. While everyone believes in Sufi Islam as the bedrock of the Muslim society in J&K cutting across the Pir Panjal, there are serious signs of different strains taking root in these societies. This strain or the slow change does not come from inside – but from outside, starting from Uttar Pradesh to Saudi Arabia.
This change, how much ever slow it is, needs to be understood in the right perspective and as it is without painting any colour. Only then its implications could be observed, and right action taken today, so that the future does not become complicated.
In the last few decades, there has been a steady incursion of religious thoughts from UP into J&K, especially along the Pir Panjal. Outside UP, there is another slow, but steady incursion, from the Gulf, especially Saudi Arabia. From Mendhar to Doda, many Muslim youths, thanks to the absence of opportunities, have been steadily looking for employment in the Gulf; today, there is a substantial inflow directly from the Gulf. The financial transactions in Mendhar and Surankot towns through the banks (of course, outside the hawala transactions) alone will highlight what is happening to these sub-regions.
Obviously, inflows are not restricted to cash, but also include a Saudi version of Islam. From a new “class” of people within the community to new structures of worship with a particular architecture makes this change visible — physically, economically and socially. This is where J&K can learn from Pakistan in terms of what the remittances from the Gulf, especially Saudi Arabia could do to the local social fabric. The impact is not only religious, but also sectarian. It may start with the Shias and Ahmediyas, but certainly will go after the other faiths as well — Deobandi, Brelvi and Sufi.
No one can be blamed for the above, and it is bound to happen. If only, there are adequate opportunities within and the delivery mechanisms remain relatively functional, this would not have started off in the first place. The primary problem of this communal divide is not religion, but secular. If only, there is better governance, there will be equal opportunities to every community — if only.
Unless we address the root cause, and look inward — both at the State and Society levels, we will end up making someone a scapegoat. This time the BSF. Perhaps, next time the J&K Police. And CRPF and the military and so on. For we have enough police, para-military and military in J&K to hoodwink ourselves and shift the blame.
The writer is the Director, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi
